Ryann Busillo | 1/27/2025
Introduction
In my last blog post, Terminations and Their Outcomes, we focused on the issuance of Final Termination Notices (FTNs), the portion of those FTNs that become eligible for shut-off, and the percentage of those accounts that experience shut-offs. We also explored pathways to reconnection, including the Home Energy Assistance Program (HEAP), the Department of Social Services, and Central Hudson’s primary method: Deferred Payment Agreements (DPAs).
However, while DPAs appear effective at preventing shutoffs and restoring service, there is no available data on how often customers are actually able to satisfy the terms of their DPAs. In fact, Central Hudson’s monthly collections reports list “n/a” for every month between January 2020 and June 2025. The Energy Assistance Program (EAP) collections reports – which cover households enrolled in the utility’s low-income savings program – are slightly more informative. They report the number of satisfied DPAs quarterly from January 2020 until September 2022 and then report zero every month from October 2022 through May 2025. Meaning no one in the Energy Assistance Program successfully paid off their debt through DPA’s over that time period. In comparison to the other investor-owned utilities that submit collection reports to the Department of Public Service (PCS), like National Grid, Con Edison, and Orange and Rockland, this is out of the norm.
The purpose of a Deferred Payment Agreement, as outlined by Central Hudson, is to “help customers catch up on past-due account balance,” which suggests that at some point, customers will be caught up on, or make progress on repaying, their utility debt. This is not the story Central Hudson’s numbers tell. If DPAs, while not a debt forgiveness plan, were accomplishing their goal, we would expect to see some regularity in DPA satisfaction and a corresponding decline in overall arrears. The fact that both the regular collection reports and the EAP collection reports indicate “n/a” or “0” every month since October 2022 – while arrears, and the number of households in arrears, continue to rise – is alarming.
What the Numbers Tell Us About DPAs
To better understand the role of DPAs in Central Hudson’s collections process, I graphed DPA data against other collection categories. The results were striking:
*An R² value shows how well a line or model fits the data. Broadly, R² measures how strongly related two categories are. Specifically, it tells us what percentage of the variation in the outcome is explained by the model. Values above 0.7 are generally considered strong, with values closer to 1 indicating extremely strong variable correlation.*
- DPA enrollment vs. total arrears: R² = 0.799
Figure 1. DPA Participation vs. Total Arrears Owed
Figure 2. DPA Participation vs. Total Arrears Owed (Jan 2020 – April 2025)
Figures 1 & 2 Discussion:
Figure 1 shows the percent of residents on deferred payment agreements (DPAs) plotted against total arrears, with an R² value of 0.799. Figure 2 presents the same data over time, with DPAs in blue and total arrears in red, visually highlighting the similarities in their trajectories. If DPAs were effectively reducing arrears, we would expect higher DPA enrollment to correspond with lower total arrears. Instead, these figures show that as more customers enter DPAs, total arrears continue to rise, indicating that DPAs are not effectively lowering household debt at the system level.
- DPA enrollment vs. average household debt: R² = 0.778
Figure 3. DPA Participation Vs. Average Household Debt
Figure 4. DPA Participation and Average Household Debt (Jan 2020 – April 2025)
Figures 3 & 4 Discussion:
Figure 3 shows the percent of residents on deferred payment agreements (DPAs) plotted against average household arrears, with an R² value of 0.778. Figure 4 presents the same data over time, with DPAs in blue and average household arrears in red, highlighting the similarities in their trajectories. If DPAs were effectively reducing household debt, we would expect higher DPA enrollment to correspond with lower average arrears. Instead, these figures show that even as more households enter DPAs, average household arrears remain largely unchanged, indicating that DPAs have limited impact on debt reduction at the system level.
- DPA enrollment vs. monthly termination (post-moratorium): R² = 0.758
Figure 5. DPA Participation vs. Monthly Terminations (May 2024 – April 2025)
Figure 6. DPA Participation and Terminations (May 2024 – April 2025)
Figures 5 & 6 Discussion:
Figure 5 shows the percent of residents in deferred payment agreements (DPAs) plotted against terminations, with an R² value of 0.758. Figure 6 presents the same data over time, from May 2024 to April 2025, highlighting post-moratorium effects. Ideally, we would expect to see fewer terminations as more households enter DPAs, since the program is designed to help customers stay current on their bills. While DPAs still allow individual households to avoid immediate shutoff, the strong positive correlation indicates that, overall, terminations continue to rise even as DPA enrollment increases. This points to broader operational or systemic challenges affecting arrears and disconnections at the utility level.
- Terminations for non-payment vs. reconnections via DPA: R² = 0.967
Figure 7. Terminations For Non-Payment vs. Reconnections Due to DPA
Figure 8. Terminations and Reconnections Due to DPA (Jan 2020 – June 2025)
Figures 7 & 8 Discussion:
Figure 7 shows terminations and reconnections due to deferred payment agreements (DPAs), with an R² value of 0.967. This strong positive correlation is expected and reflects the core purpose of DPAs: allowing households who experience disconnection to regain service. Figure 8 presents the same data over time, with terminations in dark blue and reconnections in green, visually highlighting how closely these two categories move together. Unlike the concerning trends seen in overall arrears or DPA enrollment, these figures demonstrate that DPAs are functioning effectively for service restoration at the individual household level.
These strong positive correlations suggest that Deferred Payment Agreements (DPAs) do not prevent the rise of household arrears. Instead, as more customers fall behind on their bills and face service termination, DPA enrollment rises in tandem, revealing a troubling mismatch between the program’s stated intent and its actual outcomes.
In my earlier blog post, Terminations and Outcomes, I concluded that DPAs (in the case of Central Hudson) have become the only consistent path to avoid disconnection and restore service. This new analysis adds a more troubling dimension: if the most reliable tool for reconnection is also ineffective at reducing debt, then we are relying on a mechanism that perpetuates, rather than resolves, financial distress. In other words, DPAs may help households temporarily avoid the consequences of arrears, but they do little to address the underlying cause… chronic unaffordability. This contradiction calls into question the long-term efficacy of DPAs and demands a deeper examination of their role. Even if some DPAs are being satisfied (and Central Hudson simply isn’t reporting it), if overall arrears continue to rise, what purpose are these agreements truly serving?
Why DPAs Might be Failing:
1. The terms of DPAs are unmanageable:
Deferred Payment Agreements (DPAs) are only available to customers who are already in arrears. If you’re eligible for a DPA, it’s because you owe Central Hudson money and the agreement is the utility’s main tool to prevent shutoff and restore service. For more on how down payments and monthly terms are typically negotiated, check out this blog.
If a customer already can’t afford their monthly bill, how are they supposed to pay their monthly bill plus an added installment toward their past-due balance? For many households, this added burden is simply unsustainable.
When we look at the data, it confirms what many already know intuitively: the more people who enter DPAs, the more people default. But there’s a key nuance. An increase in DPA’s only accounts for 30% of the rise in defaults. In other words, while default rates do climb as enrollment increases, there are other significant factors at play, including: the cost of energy service, income, the size of arrears, and the lack of meaningful debt relief options. Increased DPA enrollment alone is not causing accounts to default; accounts are defaulting because the system is not structured to assist, it is structured to extract, irrespective of human well-being.
Figure 9. Customers in arrears with deferred payment agreements compared to deferred payment agreements defaulted, with an R² value of 0.304.
2. The structure of DPAs reinforces chronic debt
Rather than helping customers meaningfully reduce what they owe, DPAs often just stretch debt over time without offering real relief or forgiveness. Many customers fall into a cycle where they default on one plan and then enter another, essentially restarting the payment clock without ever catching up. Notably, Central Hudson has not reported a single reinstated DPA since before the rollout of its new billing system in September 2021. These “rolling DPAs”—whether a new DPA altogether or a reinstated one that wasn’t reported—don’t resolve debt. At least, there isn’t evidence that they do. They seem to postpone the consequences of mounting utility debt, allowing customers to stay connected while their overall balance grows, which is why we see arrears continuing to grow despite these payment plans.
Due to the limited information available, we are unable to follow specific accounts to verify if this is what is actually happening; all we know is the number of DPAs and defaults, making it difficult to interpret that data as a cohesive story.
Additionally, as a for-profit company, Central Hudson’s primary obligation is to generate returns for its shareholders, which can influence how it approaches payment plans. From this perspective, even a partially paid DPA still contributes to the company’s bottom line. As concluded in Terminations and Their Outcomes, the main and most effective way to avoid a shut-off or get reconnected is by entering a DPA. When we connect this finding to Central Hudson’s bottom line—generate profit for shareholders— it becomes clear that DPAs ultimately serve the company’s interests more than customers’.
3. Energy is too expensive
Energy is becoming increasingly unaffordable. As of July 2025, the Consumer Price Index shows electricity costs up 5.5% over the past year and natural gas prices up 13.8%—the two most common residential energy sources (Bureau of Labor Statistics). From May 2024 to May 2025, the average U.S. residential electricity price climbed 6.5%, from 16.41¢ to 17.47¢ per kilowatt-hour, with analysts warning that the rapid growth of data centers could push prices even higher (Axios). Between January 2021 and April 2024, electricity prices increased by 29.4%, underscoring that the burden on households is not just a short-term spike but part of a sustained upward trend (New York Post). The average household is now paying about $140 per month for electricity (ElectricityPlans). For many families, these bills are not just inconvenient—they threaten household stability and financial security. In the Hudson Valley, Central Hudson Gas & Electric residential customers saw a 3% increase on electric bills and a 5.2% increase on natural gas bills just this past September 1, 2025. Read more about these rate changes in this article.
A Note on Internal Tracking and Data Issues
For a moment, I want to consider this as a data issue, where Central Hudson simply has not maintained a method for tracking and reporting DPA completion. Under this assumption and given Central Hudson’s history, it is plausible the utility is still working through internal issues, and reporting on satisfied DPAs is not one of their priorities. However, there are two issues I take with this logic: One, if this data issue began as a consequence of the new billing system, then we would have DPA satisfaction numbers for January 2020 to August 2021. And, is tracking DPA satisfaction really that different from tracking DPAs made, reinstated, defaulted, and active?
Additionally, there is something to be said about the role of the Department of Public Service (PSC). It is their responsibility to hold Central Hudson accountable for reporting these numbers, and after five years of no data in Central Hudson’s collections reports, I wonder if they know about this data issue – or if their focus just hasn’t reached it yet. As previously mentioned, other utilities monitored by the PSC do report satisfied DPA’s highlighting how this issue is unique to Central Hudson.
In all fairness, I believe it is unlikely that none of Central Hudson’s DPAs are being satisfied, yet month after month, reporting “0” or “N/A” is a pattern that demands explanation.
Conclusion
While superficially, this is a data issue, at its core, it is a policy and equity issue. Without accurate reporting, it is difficult to assess whether DPAs are actually helping customers regain financial stability or simply delaying disconnections. Moreover, the whole point of having private utilities report monthly collections to the Department of Public Service (DPS) is to help regulators and advocates protect the public interest. Without this check, the system will inevitably fall out of balance, if it hasn’t already, when the ability to recommend or implement better solutions is hindered. We need Central Hudson to not just report on new enrollment, active, and defaulted DPAs, but to prioritize reporting on satisfied DPAs. Without this change, we are still left with the question: Are DPAs helping Central Hudson customers? And if so, to what extent?
Figure 11. Increasing percent of residents on deferred payment agreements, increasing average debt, and increasing terminations over time.
